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TRENDS IN LABOR ARBITRATION i
by
Nathan P. Feinsinger*
IS paper was originally planned as a discussion of the arbitra-
It ion of "grievances." In the light of certain developments in the
steel dispute, however, forecasting a significantly broader role for
arbitration and other forms of third party participation in the solu-
tion of labor-management problems, a correspondingly broader ap-
proach to the subject has been taken.
I hope I am not being merely pollyannish when I venture the
opinion that, despite its immediate hardship to all concerned, the steel
dispute of 1959 may, in the long run, prove to have been a construc-
tive experience for the nation as a whole. The steel dispute is widely
regarded as evidencing a failure of the process of collective bargain-
ing as an instrumentality of national labor policy. I do not share this
view. An automobile may have perfectly good brakes but an accident
may occur, particularly on slippery roads, if the driver does not
apply them properly. So, in the steel case, the difficulty as I see it, is
the failure of the parties to make proper use of a quite adequate
facility. If that be so, the remedy is not to seek a substitute but to
stimulate labor and management to use the collective bargaining
process more effectively in their own self interest and, more vitally,
in the public interest. The steel dispute has dramatized this need.
Ways and means are being seriously studied and discussed by the
government, by the press, by the experts, and by labor and manage-
ment, including, at this moment, the steel industry and the steel-
workers' union. The results cannot help but be constructive.
One cannot forecast all the results of this ferment. One result is
fairly certain, however. There is sure to be an increase in the use of
ttneutrals" in the capacity of mediators, fact finders, or arbitrators,
either by private agreement or through government appointment,
to handle a broad range of labor-management problems. This devel-
opment will not dilute the collective bargaining process but will, if
properly used, enrich that process and make it serve more effectively
as a means to the twin goals of our national labor policy, namely,
industrial justice and industrial peace.
If third party participation in the collective bargaining process
t From an address delivered at the Southwestern Legal Foundation Institute on Labor
Law (1959), during the steel dispute of 1959.
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is to be most effective, whether by private individuals, by the courts
(in applying the Lincoln Mills' doctrine, for example), or through
other governmental agencies, the nature and purposes of that process
must be fully understood. Under the National Labor Relations Act,2
as amended, collective bargaining is defined as "the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet . . . and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached. . ."' This language may
suffice as a legal definition but does not adequately describe the in-
stitution of collective bargaining or explain the objectives of Con-
gress in imposing the duty to bargain. Collective bargaining is a
procedure designed to reconcile the conflicting interests of labor and
management and to promote cooperation in their day-to-day relation-
ships in the interest of industrial justice and industrial peace. It is
designed, on the one hand, as an alternative to unilateral determina-
tion of wages and other conditions of employment by management or
labor, and, on the other hand, as an alternative to determination by
some agency of government.
In expressing its preference for collective bargaining rather than
unilateral determination, Congress sought to remove the inequities
which had resulted from the inequality of bargaining power between
the individual employee and his employer. Through collective action,
workers were to be given a voice, through their unions, in determining
the conditions of their employment, which meant, inevitably, a cor-
responding limitation on what is commonly described as "management
prerogative." Through increased economic strength resulting from
collective action, workers were expected to raise their wage levels.
Through the spread of organization, unions were expected to stabilize
competitive wages and working conditions within and between in-
dustries.
In expressing its preference for voluntary collective bargaining
rather than governmental determination, Congress expected the par-
ties to assume the responsibilities which go with self-government.
More particularly, while strikes and lockouts were not banned, Con-
gress hoped that labor and management would utilize collective bar-
gaining as an instrumentality of industrial peace. This hope was based
'Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C.A. § 141 (1959).
329 U.S.C.A. S 158.
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on the experience of various impartial investigatory commissions, best
summarized, perhaps, in a report which stated:
The chief advantage which comes from the practice of periodically
determining the conditions of labor by collective bargaining directly
between employers and employees is, that thereby each side obtains a
better understanding of the actual state of the industry, of the con-
ditions which confront the other side, and of the motives which in-
fluence it. Most strikes and lockouts would not occur if each party
understood exactly the position of the other. Where representatives of
employers and employees can meet personally together and discuss all
the considerations on which the wage scale and the conditions of labor
would be based, a satisfactory agreement can, in the great majority
of instances, be reached."
The assumption that collective bargaining would minimize indus-
trial strife was expressed in the preamble to the National Labor Rela-
tions (Wagner) Act of 1935' and repeated in its amendments there-
to by the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of
1947. Congress declared its purpose to be that of "encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining"7 because such prac-
tices were "fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial dis-
putes"8 which would otherwise adversely affect interstate commerce.
Shortly before the Wagner Act, Congress had expressed the view,
embodied in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,s that the courts were
not a proper forum to resolve labor disputes, whether by injunction
or otherwise. This view was modified by the Taft-Hartley Act,
notably section 301, which authorizes suits in the federal courts for
violation of contracts between employer and unions. For our pur-
poses, the most significant development since in that area is the
Lincoln Mills decision of 1957," construing section 301 as authoriz-
ing suits for specific performance of agreements to arbitrate.
Since 1935, collective bargaining has become the way of industrial
life in a large segment of our economy. The hope and expectations
of Congress have been partly realized. Workers now exercise a voice
in their employment conditions. Wage levels have been increased.
Strikes over union recognition have been minimized. Strikes over the
multitude of grievances which arose in the day-to-day administration
of collective bargaining agreements have been largely eliminated by
'Industrial Commission Report to Congress (1902).
549 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1946).
661 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 5 141 (1959).
29 U.S.C.A. § 151.
s Ibid.
947 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. 5 101 (1952).
"
0 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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the voluntary adoption of internal procedures culminating in "final
and binding" arbitration. But certain basic problems remain in the
same or altered form and new ones have been added which have per-
plexed the parties and the public and have created fresh interest in
arbitration in some other "third dimension" as a means of solution.
What are these problems? To what extent can they be solved by the
parties directly? To what extent by the aid of third parties? To what
extent by legislation only, and what kind?
(1) The stabilization of wage rates within and between industries
has been impeded by the virtual halt to the spread of unionization.
Competition from non-union plants concerns organized employers
and union alike. Understandably, organized employers have sought
cooperation from unions in seeking to reduce labor costs by increased
efficiency and economies in various forms. Also understandably, the
unions in these cases, though recognizing the employer's problem,
have been reluctant to extend cooperation to the extent of relinquish-
ing benefits already achieved in the form of wage rates or other con-
ditions of employment; or agreeing to unilateral action in such mat-
ters as subcontracting, shift schedules, work loads, crew size, trans-
fers, and the like; or accepting improvements less than those obtained
by other unions. In the steel case, management has asserted that a
similar problem exists stemming not from competition within the
industry but from foreign competition in steel and from competition
with other materials produced in this country.
(2) Even aside from the pressure of competition, management is
becoming increasingly insistent on recapturing the "right to manage"
which it feels has been impaired by the process of collective bargain-
ing, resulting (in its opinion) in inefficient and uneconomical prac-
tices which hamper production. This attitude may have received some
stimulation from the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in the American National Insurance" case, holding that it is not a
violation of the duty to bargain collectively for an employer to
insist that the union agree to unilateral control over some matters,
such as promotions, discipline, and work schedules, which are clearly
"mandatory" subjects of collective bargaining. The unions have re-
sisted this trend on the ground that management is attempting "to
turn the clock back" or to "break the union." In this area, perhaps
more than in any other, old fears and antagonisms are being resur-
rected.
(3) Parallel to management's concern with what it regards as re-
" NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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strictive, inefficient, or uneconomic practices is the union's fear that
regardless of management's motive, the effect of its decisions is to
diminish job opportunities and impair job security. For these reasons,
it is opposed, for example, to subcontracting and to transfering work
out of the bargaining unit to "white collar" personnel within the
plant, two of today's most perplexing problems.
(4) On the question of wage levels, the emphasis has shifted
materially since 1935. At that time, Congress was concerned with
raising wage levels in order to increase the purchasing power of wage
earners and thus prevent depressions. In many quarters today, it is
asserted that the real problem is that of "excessive" wage settlements
adding to the danger of inflation. Unions continue to adhere to the
mass purchasing power theory and point to "administered prices" as
the villain in the piece. I am not a good enough economist to choose
between these positions. The important fact is that thus far Con-
gress has left the question of proper wage levels to be determined by
collective bargaining and the question of wage-price-profit relation-
ships to unilateral determination by management. Under the existing
interpretation of the duty to bargain, labor has no legally enforceable
right to bargain about prices or profits and no right to a "look at the
books" except when the employer pleads inability to pay. Whether
or not this limitation is sound public policy, labor regards it as unfair
to be asked to limit its wage demands in order to stabilize prices with
no assurance that its concessions would have that effect and no right
to bargain about a proper wage-price-profit relationship. Thus far,
management has held firmly to the view that prices and profits are
no concern of the unions at the bargaining table. With labor and
management thus holding opposite views, the question arises as to
whether collective bargaining is a suitable procedure for determining
proper wage levels and, if not, what other procedure should be
followed.
To what extent can these problems, or any of them, be solved by
the parties directly, i.e., by direct negotiation without third party
intervention, in a mutually satisfactory manner and without a strike?
The answer is, in all of them, and completely. (Whether a particular
settlement is in the public interest may present a different question.)
The obvious support for this broad assertion is the fact that many
employers and unions, large and small, in all industries and areas, do
settle such problems directly. For example, speaking of the contro-
versial issue of "work rules" involved in the current steel dispute,
the board chairman and president of Detroit Steel, upon settlement
19601
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with the union, reportedly stated that "the company always had
been able to work out any problems that came up in this respect
through conferences between its industrial relations officials and union
representatives, and . . . any future problems would be handled the
same way."1 It is true that this company does not have a "Clause
2-B" in its contract, but it would be naive to assume that the same
problems do not arise when the company desires to change existing
practices. In the auto industry, in which the search for improved
efficiency is ceaseless, no problem of this kind, as far as I am aware,
has ever presented a serious strike issue.
Why is it that in some companies in an industry or in some indus-
tries, and not in others, such problems cannot be settled, apparently,
without a strike? The answer, I believe, lies in the frame of mind
with which the representatives approach the bargaining table. By
one approach, the parties recognize the problem, undertake to ana-
lyze it in terms of existing fact, prior experiences, and reasonable an-
ticipation, and seek a sensible solution, based on mutual confidence
that the spirit as well as the letter of the settlement will be observed.
By another approach, one side or the other, or perhaps both, refuse to
recognize the problem, or, admitting the existence of the problem,
attribute to it such symbolism as "management perogative" or
"tunion busting," thus frustrating a realistic solution. As a result of
this approach, when agreement is reached, it is likely to be treated
as a victory or defeat in principle, rather than a fair settlement, thus
depriving the settlement of its real value, and perhaps laying the
foundation for future strife.
The problem of establishing a proper wage level is sometimes dis-
tinguished from other bargaining problems, and the efficacy of pri-
vate bargaining in this area is sometimes questioned on the theory
that the public has a more direct interest in terms of possible infla-
tionary consequences, and on the assumption that "excessive" wage
increases necessarily result in increased prices. The distinction is not
realistic. To begin with, the wage rate is only one element of labor
costs. So-called "fringe benefits" are also a significant element. In
addition, any restriction on management's freedom of operation, even
a simple seniority clause (however justifiable in terms of employee
satisfaction or security) may increase labor costs. The important
question is not what management pays but what it receives in return.
Just as a union may reduce its wage demand in exchange for a union
shop to strengthen its bargaining position in the long run, so manage-
"2Wall Street Journal, Oct. 28, 1959, p. 3 (Midwest ed.).
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ment may increase its wage offer in exchange for assurances
of increased operating efficiency and economy. This is the theory on
which the automobile industry has agreed to an "annual improvement
factor" in the wage package in consideration of the union's agree-
ment to cooperate in "technological progress, better tools, methods,
processes and equipment." This is also the justification advanced by
the steel industry's negotiating committee for linking the size of its
wage offer to its demand for changes in the work rules. Thus, to
brand a wage increase size either as "inadequate" or "inflationary"
solely on the basis of its size is an oversimplification.
Assuming it were possible to separate the wage rate from other
cost and benefit factors, it would still be difficult to characterize a
particular wage increase as inadequate, inflationary, or "just right."
There is no universally accepted criterion of a "just right" wage
increase. Contribution to "increased productivity" comes the closest,
but, as the steel negotiations indicate, there is disagreement, for ex-
ample, on the relevant measure of productivity. Again, as the steel
case illustrates, the cost of a strike, the loss of wages and profits to
the immediate parties and related employers and workers, and the
loss of tax revenue to the government, are factors in the wage equa-
tion which cannot be overlooked. It is no answer to say that a union
should not be permitted to "hold a gun at the public's back" or to
"lift itself up by its own bootstraps" through a prolonged strike any
more than the employer through a prolonged "no." The right to say
"no" or to strike has thus far not been limited to cases where no
hardship to the public results.
Thus far, I have discussed some of the difficult problems which
confront the parties in collective bargaining and have indicated my
belief that none of them is insoluble by direct negotiation, provided
the parties deal in realities and not in shibboleths. When collective
bargaining fails to produce a solution, what then? Is a strike the in-
evitable next step? In resolving grievance disputes, labor and manage-
ment have found a substitute for strikes in voluntary arbitration. In
this country, arbitration is generally distinguished from other forms
of third party intervention by the "final and binding" character of
the solution proposed by the arbitrator. I am inclined to feel that
this aspect of arbitration process, while important, has been over-
emphasized. A final and binding decision is not worth much to the
parties unless it falls within the area of acceptability to both parties
to a dispute. The extent to which this result may be accomplished
depends in part on the kind of arbitration the parties desire. They
19601
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may prefer what is sometimes called a "judicial" process, which
often tends to obscure the real problem. At the other extreme, they
may prefer a mediation process, with the arbitrator empowered to
rule if mediation should fail. In between are all sorts of variations.
Recently, for example, after I had declined a request to arbitrate a
grievance dispute which would have taken several days, the parties
asked if I would meet with them to discuss their chances if they
were to arbitrate before someone else. I agreed. After an hour or so
of amiable conversation with the parties, sitting in comfortable chairs
in the company lawyer's office, I made my best guess and gave my
reasons. Ten minutes later, the case had been settled and the settle-
ment embodied in a one paragraph letter to the union. As I was
leaving, someone said, "Hey, you know what you have done? You've
arbitrated this case." Indignantly, I denied the charge. As someone
is reputed to have said, "The Iliad was not written by Homer, but
by another man of the same name."
Can voluntary arbitration, or some variation thereof, be adapted
to the settlement of disputes in the making of a contract as contrasted
with disputes arising as to the interpretation or application of an
existing contract? There is, of course, some experience in this area.
However, management generally, labor less so, is reluctant to agree
to arbitrate contract terms, one argument being that the risk is too
great. The validity of this objection depends, of course, on the issue
involved and the terms of the submission. There is not much differ-
ence in risk, for example, and perhaps less in asking an arbitrator to
decide what the contract should provide on the issue of subcontract-
ing (assuming he is fully informed of the management's problems, as
well as the union's) and asking him to decide in the absence of a
clear prohibition or reservation in this agreement, whether the man-
agement may subcontract if the union objects, or the limitations, if
any, on the right.
In the steel case, the difficulty in resolving the work rules issue has
not been management's reluctance to submit the matter to arbitration,
but the terms of the proposed submission. The industry's proposal
read as follows:
What, if any, changes should be made in the local working conditions
provisions to enable the companies to take reasonable steps to improve
efficiency and eliminate waste, with due regard for the welfare of the
employes?
The union's objections to this form of submission are that the
question is loaded and that it is bound to cause loss of existing bene-
[ Vol. 14
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fits with no possibility of offsetting gain. Suppose, however, that the
submission were revised to read as follows:
1. In any plant covered by the main agreements, are there presently
existing local working conditions or practices protected by Section 2-B,
and not otherwise, which substantially interfere with the efficient and
economical operation of that plant? Management shall have the burden
of proof on this issue.
2. In each instance so found, if any, is there, nevertheless, a reasonable
justification for the condition or practice? The union shall have the
burden of proof on this issue.
3. In each instance, if any, in which the arbitrators shall find no reason-
able justification for the condition or practice in its present form, the
arbitrators shall determine the appropriate form of relief to manage-
ment, including elimination or modification of such condition or prac-
tice.
4. In each instance, if any, in which relief is granted to management,
the arbitrators shall determine what, if any, hardship will result, by loss
of job security, by wage loss, or otherwise, to the employee or employees
affected, and shall provide adequate relief for such hardship, in the
form of monetary damages or otherwise.
Aside from final and binding arbitration, other forms of non-
governmental third party assistance in the avoidance or settlement
of strikes over contract terms are beginning to emerge. For example,
in recent years Allis-Chalmers and International Harvester and the
UAW have successfully avoided or shortened such strikes by the use
of private mediators acting independently or in collaboration with
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. In dealing with prob-
lems of automation in the meat-packing industry, Armour & Com-
pany and the UPWA provided for a a joint committee, with an
impartial chairman, to formulate means of training employes for new
or changed jobs. In the steel industry, Kaiser Steel Corporation and
the steel workers established a three-man committee of neutral ex-
perts (1) to study the work rules problem and make recommenda-
tions for the next contract negotiation and (2) to work out "a lan-
guage formula to insure a proper sharing of the fruits of the com-
pany's progress among stockholders, employees and the public." The
steel industry negotiating committee took a more cautious yet signi-
ficant step in the same direction by proposing a Human Relations
Research Committee chaired by two neutrals, one selected by each
side, to study and recommend solutions of specific problems and
"such overall problems as the parties may from time to time refer
to such committee."
In my opinion, the trend toward voluntary resort to the use of
19601
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private neutral third parties to resolve contract-making problems in
basic industries is the most significant development of our time and
holds the greatest promise for future industrial peace. The voluntary
character of this step and the flexibility which it provides the parties
in their choice of procedures-mediation, fact finding, recommen-
dations, or final and binding decision-are its outstanding virtues.
Intervention by the government at this time, beyond encouraging
and assisting the parties to any particular dispute to establish such
a procedure, would be a serious mistake. For one thing, it would tend
to halt this significant development, because one side or the other
might be tempted to use the new government device, whatever it
might be, if it saw advantages for its position. For another, the var-
ious proposals for government intervention ' ranging from compul-
sory fact-finding to compulsory intervention, and all carrying an im-
plied threat of government regulation of wages, prices, and profits,
would impair the essential voluntary character of collective bargain-
ing without any assurance of greater industrial justice or peace in the
long run.
Conclusion
Collective bargaining has not failed. The fact is, however, that
its potentialities as an instrument of industrial justice and peace have
not been fully utilized. Considering the heavy responsibilities which
Congress has imposed upon labor and management which in other
countries are assumed by the government itself, labor and manage-
ment have done a good job. But not good enough. The most con-
structive step which they can take to improve their performance is
to make wider use of voluntary arbitration, with less emphasis on
its "final and binding" character, and more emphasis on its utility for
solving problems.
"aSee the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 21, 1959, p. 1 (Midwest ed.).
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